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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "LABOR DISPUTE" AS
DEFINED IN THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT AND THE
PENNSYLVANIA LABOR ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
It is not the purpose of this note to make an exhaustive review of all the
federal and Pennsylvania cases involving labor disputes since 1933, but rather it
is the writer's plan to show how the federal and Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the same definition in cases involving almost identical fact situations
and reached results which are, to say the least, not entirely harmonious.
First, let us examine briefly the history of injunction as applied to labor disputes. Until 1895, the equity powers of the courts had rarely been used in labor
disputes to restrain the illegal acts of union sympathizers during strikes. The first
important labor injunction case was In re Debs,1 where the Supreme Court of the
United States approved the granting of an injunction prohibiting the obstruction
of railroads as used in interstate commerce in the Chicago railroad strikes. After
this case, "the courts were frequently free in the support which they gave to employers by the issuance of injunctions to alter the entire status quo in a strike where
some illegal acts had been perpetrated." 2
In 1914, the Clayton Act 3 was passed. The purpose of this act was to deprive the federal courts of the power to issue sweeping injunctions in labor disputes. The Act defined "labor disputes" as "controversies involving terms or conditions of employment." But this definition was emasculated by the courts interpreting it so as to remove from its scope cases where all of the contesting parties
were not in the proximate relation of employer and employee.4
Then in 1933, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 5 was passed.

This Act provides:8

"(a)
A case shall be held to grow out of a labor dispute when
the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade,
craft, or occupation; or who have direct or indirect interests therein;
or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of
the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees
whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers, and one or more employees or associations of
employees; (2) between one or more employers . . .and one or
1158 U. S. 564 (1895).
2
FRANKFURTER and GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 37.

838 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. 52.
4Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) ; also Van Dusen, The Progrers of
Labor Law (1939), 14 TEMPLE L. Q. 1, at 13.
547
Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. 101 eiseq.
6
Stat. 70, sec. 13 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. 113.
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more employers . . .; or (3) between one or more employees . . .
and one or more employees . . .; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as hereinafter
defined) of 'persons participating or interested therein' (as hereinafter defined),
"(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person
participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against
him or it, and if he . . . is engaged in the same industry . . . in
which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein,
or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in
whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry . . .
"(c)
The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
Pennsylvania has the same provision substantially in its Labor Anti-Injunction
Act passed in 1937.7
The purpose of this definition of "labor dispute" was obviously to overcome
the restrictive definition as the courts interpreted "labor dispute" in the Clayton
Act. An examination of the federal cases indicates that this purpose has been
accomplished. In Senn v. Tile Layer's Protective Union,8 the State of Wisconsin
had a statute similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the statute defining labor dispute in the same way. Defendant Union attempted to get plaintiff to join their
union. Plaintiff was a small tile contractor who employed several apprentices and
journeymen, but plaintiff did most of the work himself. There was no dispute
of any kind between the plaintiff and his employees. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendant union from picketing his place of business. The
Supreme Court of the United States held this to be a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of the Act. Another case in point is that of Lauf v. Skinner,9 where
the court repeated that there is a labor dispute within the meaning of the NorrisLaGuardia Act notwithstanding the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties to the suit.

71937, P. L. 1198, 43 PS 206.
8301 U. S. 867 (1937).

9303 U. S. 323 (1938).
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An even stronger case is that of New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. 10
In that case, plaintiff was a corporation which operated many stores, and employed
both white and colored persons. Defendant was a corporation composed of
negroes, organized for the promotion of educational, benevolent, and charitable
enterprises. No relation of employer-employee existed between plaintiff and defendant, nor was plaintiff engaged in any business competitive with defendant.
But defendant had made demands upon plaintiff that it employ more colored
persons in its stores. Defendant threatened to persuade its members not to patronize plaintiff's stores, and in pursuance of this, it picketed them. Plaintiff sought
an injunction restraining defendant from carrying on these activities. The court
held this to be a labor dispute within the meaning of the Act and denied the injunction.
The next case for examination is that of Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake
Valley." Plaintiff was an Illinois corporation engaged in processing and distributing milk and dairy products. Milk is supplied to the plaintiff corporation, which
pasteurizes and bottles it and sells it to persons known as "vendors," who individually own and operate their own trucks. After these "vendors" purchase th'e
milk, they distribute it to stores which in turn sell it to the public. These vendors
do not belong to Defendant Union. Prices at the stores are less than prices at
private homes. Defendant Union picketed the stores which sold the milk of plaintiff dairy. Plaintiff brought suit to restrain the defendant Union from picketing.
The District Court dismissed the suit, contending it had no jurisdiction because
this was a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. On
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the District Court's decision was reversed,
and the case was remanded. The court based its decision on the ground that the
"vendors" were independent contractors, that no labor dispute was involved, and
that the dispute was over the sale of cut-rate milk and the vendor system. (It is
interesting in passing to note that to sustain its decision, this court cited the case
of Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Driver's Union.12 In that case, suit had
been brought to enjoin defendant union from attempting to interfere with the sale
of plaintiff's products by picketing stores where its products were sold, and doing
other unlawful acts of violence in furtherance of a conspiracy to injure plaintiff's
business. The court allowed the injunction to issue, but admitted that the Illinois
Anti-Injunction Statute and its definition of "labor dispute" was analogous to the
Clayton Act, not the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that if Illinois had a statute similar,
to the latter, this would be a labor dispute within the meaning of that act.)
10303 U. S. 552 (1938).
11108 Fed. (2d) 436 (1940).

1221 N. E. (2d) (I1.) 308 (1239).
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On further appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the decision
of the District Court in the Lake Valley13 case was affirmed. The court held that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to labor disputes between "persons who are
engaged in the same industry . . .;or have direct or indirect interests therein." 1' 4
Here all the parties had direct or indirect interests in the production, processing,
sale and distribution of milk. The court went further and said that federal courts
have no jurisdiction to grant injunctions in cases growing out of labor disputes
merely because alleged violations of the Sherman Act are involved.
Thus it appears from a reading of these cases that the federal courts have
taken the position that the Norris-LaGuardia Act operates irrespective of whether
the persons sought to be enjoined are in fact employees, thus giving the Act the
strength which the Clayton Act, by judicial interpretation, lacked, and at the same
time allowing the Act to serve the purpose for which it was passed.
How have the Pennsylvania courts approached the problem of interpretation
of the term "labor dispute"? Pennsylvania, by the Act of 193716 adopted an AntiInjunction statute; by this act, the term "labor dispute" is defined in almost
identical language as in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. And yet the holdings of the
two courts have been almost diametrically opposed in cases presenting the problem

on substantially similar fact situations.
One of the first Pennsylvania cases involving the problem was that of Dorringlon v. Manning.16 In that case, plaintiffs were employees. Their employer
had made a contract with defendant labor union whereby the employer had agreed
to a closed shop, with the understanding that all employees in the service of the
employer at the time of the agreement would so continue and become members
of the union. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendant union from interfering with
the contractual relations with their employer, who had discharged plaintiffs under
the closed-shop agreement after the union had denied membership to the plaintiffs.
The court held that the controversy did not involve terms or conditions of employment within the meaning of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, and said: "altho
the definition of 'labor dispute' is comprehensive . . . it seems manifest that a
dispute is not a dispute unless the controversy is over 'terms or conditions of employment' or the association or representation of persons in negotiating . ..or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment . ..' Here there was no
controversy concerning the terms or conditions of employment."
1385 L. Ed. 91 (1940).
1447 Stat. 70, sec. 13(a) (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. 113(a).
151937, P. L. 1198, 43 PS 206.
16135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939).
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Another typical case showing the attitude of the Pennsylvania courts is that
of Yale Knitting Mills v. Union.17 The Supreme Court held in that case that a
trial court was justified in issuing a preliminary injunction without making the
findings required by the Labor Anti-Injunction Act to restrain illegal acts where
union members in the women's clothing industry were picketing and otherwise
attempting to coerce complainant to employ none but members of defendant union.
No employees of complainant belonged to defendant union, but the wages and
hours in complainant's shop did not meet union requirements. In order to allow
the preliminary injunction to issue, the court had to find that no labor dispute existed, and this they did, in spite of the unambiguous language of the statute.
Another case which raised the problem is that of Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen
Supply Drivers' Union.18 In that case, plaintiffs were "bob-tail" drivers of laundry trucks who operated these trucks for the solicitation of business and the delivery of laundry. While they were not employees of the laundries, they did perform the same work as the employee-drivers of the laundries who were members
of defendant union. Defendant union and the laundry-employers had entered
into a contract, the provisions of which related to these "bob-tail" drivers and the
purpose of which was to make them join the union or be forced out of business.
The "bob-tails" sought an injunction against the carrying out of these provisions
of the contract between defendant union and the laundries. The court allowed
the injunction to issue, saying in effect that this was not a labor dispute within the
meaning of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act becaus-e it did not deal with labor
relations between the laundry companies and their employees, but with trade relations between the laundry companies and the "bob-tails". In view of the express wording of the statute that the term "labor dispute" includes "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee",
it would appear that the court overlooked this latter provision and fell back upon
the definition of labor dispute as it was interpreted under the Clayton Act by the
federal courts.
The Schwartz case invites a comparison with the Milk Wagon Drivers' Union
case. Although the problem did not arise in the same manner, the facts are substantially similar, while the holdings are directly opposed. It is interesting to
speculate in passing whether the result of the Schwartz case would have been
different if the court would have had the authority of the Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union case to rely on, for in point of time the Schwartz case preceded the other
by about four months.
17334 Pa. 353, 5 A. (2d) 323 (1939).
18339 Pa. 353, 14 A. (2d) 438 (1940).
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However that may be, Pennsylvania has not modified its position. In Ralston
v. Cunningham,"9 the dispute was essentially between two labor unions. In 1939,
defendant union, an affiliate of the C.I.O., had been elected as the bargaining
agent for the employees of Hood & Co. The contract between the defendant union
and Hood & Co. provided that any employee who was a member of the defendant
union or who had made application for membership and had failed to pay his
weekly union dues for three weeks could be laid off and not be permitted to work
until he had paid his dues. Plaintiffs were employees of Hood & Co. and had
filed application for membership in defendant union in 1937. In 1938, plaintiffs
joined the United Leather Worker's Union, affiliated with the A. F. of L., and
took an active part in the affairs of that union, but did not resign from defendant
union. Upon being informed that they were in the group covered by the agreement between Hood & Co. and the defendant union, plaintiffs filed a bill in equity
seeking to enjoin Hood & Co. from discharging plaintiffs from their employment,
and from requiring plaintiffs to pay dues to the defendant union. The court dismissed the bill, but in so doing, stated categorically that "we do not regard this
controversy as a labor dispute. . . We know of no case which compels us to
hold that the disputed interpretation. of an admittedly legal (labor) contract is a
'labor dispute' within the intendment of labor law." 20 And, at page 111 of the
same case, the court continues. "The instant case is the result of a difference of
opinion as to the construiction of a contract which apparently settled a labor dispute. The controversy involves and grows out of the contract, and in no way
involves or grows out of a labor dispute . . ."
Having examined these federal and Pennsylvania cases, it is difficult to make
any generalizations. Each case is confined to its facts, none of the cases in each
court are the same, although they may involve the same problem. The result in
the Milk Wagon Drivers' Union case, 21 while not contra to that of the Scbwartz
case22 is certainly not entirely in harmony with it. Suffice it to say that the federal
courts generally have been liberal in their construction of the term "labor dispute",
using this label to attain results which are indicative of the courts' desire to limit
the use of the hitherto much-used, oft-abused weapon of the labor injunction to
quell many justifiable strikes and disputes. The Pennsylvania courts on the other
hand are more conservative in construing what is a labor dispute, and in so doing
they adhere more closely to the judicial interpretation of the term as used in the
Clayton Act which required that the parties be in the prokimate relation of employer and 'employee.

Pa. -,
18 A. (2a) 108 (1941).
201bid at 110.
2185 L. Ed. 91 (1940).
22339 Pa. 353, 14 A (2d) 438 (1940).
19-

326
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It will be interesting to see if the present prevalent strikes in defense industries will result in any change in the federal courts' liberality in determining the
scope of the term "labor dispute" as defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
SAMUEL

G.

WEISS

